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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) To establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tory termination, is a plaintiff required to show that he
was replaced by someone outside his or her protected
group?*
(2) Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, a plaintiff prior to:bringing a civil action must
first file a charge with the EEOC, usually within 300
days of the action complained of. The Question Pre-
sented is:
Where a claimant files a timely Title VII
charge asserting that employer conduct was
the result of a particular unlawful motive,
may the claimant after the end of the charge-
filing period amend that charge, or bring a
civil action, asserting that the conduct was
also the result of a second unlawful motive?
* The petition in Riley v. Elkhart Community Schools, No.
16- _, presents the related question of whether to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination in hiring or promotion, a plain-
tiff is required to show that the position at issue was filled by
someone outside his or her protected group.
ii
PARTIES
The parties to this proceeding are set forth in the
caption.
III
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Petitioner Terrence Lavigne respectfully prays
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review
the judgment and opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals entered on July 6, 2016.
OPINIONS BELOW
The July 6, 2016, opinion of the court of appeals,
which is unofficially reported at 2016 WL 3626719, is
set out at pp. la-25a of the Appendix. The July 10, 2014
opinion of the district court, which is reported at 32
F.Supp.3d 718 (M.D.La. 2014), is set out at pp. 26a-65a
of the Appendix.1
JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered
on July 6, 2016. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
1 The petition concerns the rejection of Lavigne’s claims of
unlawful termination. The district court rejected those claims in
its 2014 opinion. The district court subsequently tried, and ulti-
mately rejected, claims of discrimination in pay and in the impo-
sition of discipline. The district court decisions regarding the non-
termination claims are reported at 2016 WL 3626719 (M.D.La.
July 20, 2015), and 86 F.Supp.3d 524 (M.D.La. 2015).
2STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The statues and regulations involved are set out
at pp. 73a-75a of the Appendix.
STATEMENT
Factual Background
For a number of years prior to 2011 petitioner Ter-
rance Lavigne, who is African-American, worked as a
foreman for Cajun Deep Foundations. Foreman is the
lowest level supervisor position in the firm; the higher
level managers hold the position of superintendent
and general superintendent. There has never been a
black superintendent or general superintendent.2
Lavigne was told by two white superintendents
that he would never be promoted to the rank of super-
intendent because he was black. App. 62a. In December
2010 Lavigne complained to the general superinten-
dent that he and his brother had been referred to as
"boys" by one of the white superintendents. Id. The
general superintendent took no action to address the
use of that racial epithet.3 Lavigne also complained to
the company that he was not being paid the same
wages as the white superintendents when he was car-
rying out superintendent duties.4
Record on Appeal ("ROA") 873, 1901-02, 2086, 2181, 2224.
ROA 609,611-21,986-87.
ROA 628,806.
In February 2011, several months after Lavigne’s
complaint about the "boy" epithet, he was involved in a
minor mishap in which a construction vehicle he was
operating struck a girder. The company suspended
Lavigne for three days and placed him on probation.
App. 3a. Lavigne contended that the company only im-
posed that discipline because of his race and earlier
complaint.
In March 2011 Cajun Deep fired Lavigne. The os-
tensible reason for the dismissal was that Lavigne
had allegedly violated company policy by failing to
report several moving violations for which he had
been ticketed, and that this violation came to light
when Lavigne was on probation. Lavigne insisted the
company knew that he had not violated that policy.
Lavigne testified that in compliance with company pol-
icy he had earlier reported one moving violation to the
general superintendent (the official who later fired
him),5 and had previously reported the other moving
violation to a supervisor (the one who later used the
"boy" epithet and told Lavigne he could not be a super-
intendent because he was black).6 See App. 60a n. 13.7
5 The general superintendent was Gene Landry. ROA 673-
74, 676-77.
6 The white superintendent in question was Seth Gillen.
ROA 609,611, 676-77,786-87.
7 The company also invoked a third infraction, but Lavigne
pointed out that the state record on which the defendant relied
made clear this was not a moving violation, and thus was not cov-
ered by the company’s reporting requirement. App. 60a n.13.
4A week after Lavigne was dismissed, he visited the
New Orleans EEOC office and filled out an "Intake
Questionnaire" regarding his treatment by Cajun
Deep. Based on the information in that Questionnaire,
an EEOC official prepared a formal EEOC charge; un-
der normal agency practice an EEOC official, not the
charging party, actually prepares such a charge. In Au-
gust 2011 the EEOC sent the charge to Lavigne, who
signed and returned it to the agency. App. 34a. The
charge alleged that Cajun Deep had discriminated
against Lavigne on the basis of race. The body of the
charge contained two general allegations of racial dis-
crimination, and one paragraph that referred more
specifically to Lavigne’s claim that he had been pun-
ished for the accident because of his race, and that he
had been paid less because of his race. App. 22a-23a,
36a.
The EEOC office in New Orleans took no steps to
investigate Lavigne’s charge. After seven months of in-
action, the New Orleans office transferred the charge
to the Houston EEOC office, explaining that it was do-
ing so because the Houston office would be able to han-
dle the matter without further delay,s Within a few
days after receiving Lavigne’s charge file, an investi-
gator in the Houston EEOC office contacted Lavigne
and suggested that the charge be amended. The EEOC
then drafted the proposed amendment and sent it to
s ROA 984.
5Lavigne, who signed the amendment and returned it
to the Houston office2
The EEOC-drafted amendment supplemented the
original charge in two ways. It elaborated the earlier
general allegations of racial discrimination by adding
another specific instance of racial discrimination, as-
serting that Lavigne’s dismissal was racially moti-
vated. The amendment also alleged that the dismissal
was the result of an additional unlawful motive, an in-
tent to retaliate against Lavigne because of his earlier
discrimination complaint to the company. App. 23a,
36a-37a. The EEOC thoroughly investigated Lavigne’s
specific allegation that his dismissal was unlawful, in-
cluding both his claim of racial discrimination and his
claim of illegal retaliation. App. 24a.
Proceedings Below
Lavigne commenced this action in federal district
court, alleging that he had been fired because of his
race and in retaliation for his earlier complaint to the
company about racial discrimination.1°
The district court granted summary judgment re-
jecting the claim of discriminatory dismissal, on the
ground that following Lavigne’s termination his for-
mer position had been filled by an African-American.
9 ROA 985, 1152.
10 The complaint also alleged that Lavigne had been paid less
because of his race, and that he had been disciplined for the same
reason. Those claims were tried to the court, which ultimately re-
jected both on the merits. See n.1, supra.
6"[T]he district court held that Plaintiff had failed to
state a prima facie case of discrimination because
he had not shown ... that he had been replaced by
someone outside of his protected group." App. 15a.11
Because the district court concluded that Lavigne had
not established a prima facie case, it did not address
the conflicting evidence regarding whether the com-
pany’s key proffered justification for firing Lavigne -
his asserted failure to report moving violations - was
a fabrication concocted to cover up an unlawful dis-
criminatory motive. See App. 60a n.13.
The district court dismissed Lavigne’s retaliation
claim on a different ground. Title VII requires that,
prior to commencing a civil action, an aggrieved indi-
vidual must file a charge with the EEOC. Lavigne’s
original charge had alleged only racial discrimination,
and the amendment (which asserted the existence of a
retaliatory motive) had been filed by Lavigne (and
drafted by the EEOC) after the expiration of the 300
day charge-filing period established by Title VII. Al-
though the EEOC regulations provide that certain
amendments relate back to the date of the original
charge, Fifth Circuit precedent generally bars relation-
back where an amendment asserts a new type of
unlawful motive (here retaliation, in addition to the
original claim of racial discrimination). App. 35a. Be-
cause the amended charge added such a new asserted
11 Lavigne first contacted the EEOC on March 28, 2011. App.
19a. The company hired a new black foreman on April 13, 2011.
App. 61a. The parties disagreed about whether that new foreman
was given Lavigne’s duties. App. 16a, 61a.
7unlawful motive, the district court held that the
amendment could not relate back. App. 38a-41a.12
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of both
termination claims,13 again on distinct grounds. With
regard to the claim of racial discrimination, the court
of appeals applied the longstanding Fifth Circuit rule
that in a discriminatory dismissal case a plaintiff can-
not establish a prima facie case unless he can show
that he was replaced by a person outside the protected
class at issue. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Lavigne
could not establish a prima facie case because, it be-
lieved, he had been replaced by another African-Amer-
ican. App. 15a.
The court of appeals, like the district court, re-
jected Lavigne’s retaliation claim on the ground that
he had failed to file a timely retaliation claim with the
EEOC. The court of appeals applied a well-established
Fifth Circuit rule that an amendment to an EEOC
charge generally does not relate back if it asserts a
new, additional type of discriminatory motive. App.
16a-18a. One member of the court of appeals dissented,
arguing that the amendment should relate back. App.
23a-25a.
12 The district court concluded that Lavigne’s claim of racial
discrimination regarding his dismissal was within the scope of the
original racial discrimination charge. App. 33a-38a.
i~ The court of appeals also affirmed the district court’s re-
jection of Lavigne’s pay and discipline claims. App. 10a-15a.
8REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT CIRCUIT CON-
FLICT REGARDING WHETHER A PLAINTIFF
CLAIMING DISCRIMINATORY TERMINA-
TION MUST PROVE THAT HE OR SHE WAS
REPLACED BY A PERSON OUTSIDE HIS OR
HER PROTECTED GROUP
This case presents a recurring important issue re-
garding discriminatory terminations: whether a plain-
tiff alleging that he or she was fired on the basis of race
or some other protected characteristic is required, in
order to establish a prima facie case, to show that he
or she was replaced by someone who was not a member
of that protected group (the "replacement require-
ment’).14 In the instant case the court of appeals, ap-
plying a long series of Fifth Circuit precedents,
rejected the claim of the black plaintiff because it be-
lieved the employer had hired a black replacement to
fill the plaintiff’s position. Several other circuits apply
a similar requirement, and have rejected discrimina-
tion claims because of the race, gender or national
origin of a plaintiff’s replacement. "This [C]ourt has
not directly addressed the question of whether the
personal characteristics of someone chosen to replace
a Title VII plaintiff are material .... "St. Mary’s Honor
14 The petition in Riley v. Elkhart Community Schools, No.
16- , presents the related question of whether a plaintiff alleg-
ing that he or she was denied a job or promotion based on a pro-
tected characteristic is required to show, in order to establish a
prima facie case, that the position was filled by someone who was
not a member of his or her protected group.
9Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,527 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
A. There Is A Deeply Entrenched and Well
Recognized Circuit Conflict About This
Issue
Five circuits, including in this instance the Fifth
Circuit, apply some variant of the replacement require-
ment. Seven circuits have rejected this interpretation
of Title VII and other federal prohibitions against in-
tentional discrimination. The conflict is widely recog-
nized by courts and commentators.
(1) The court of appeals decision in this case ap-
plied a long line of Fifth Circuit precedents requiring
the plaintiff in a case alleging discriminatory termina-
tion, in order to establish a prima facie case, to show
that he "was replaced by a person outside of his pro-
tected class." App. 15a (quoting Wills v. Cleco Corp., 749
F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2014)). That requirement had
previously been spelled out in at least 14 reported and
20 unofficially reported Fifth Circuit decisions. App.
66a-72a. E.g., Finley v. Florida Parish Juvenile Deten-
tion Ctr., 574 Fed.Appx. 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2014) ("In
order to show a prima facie case of discriminatory dis-
charge, a plaintiff must first establish that [he] ... was
replaced by someone outside of the protected class")
(quoting Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476
F.3d 337,345 (5th Cir. 2007)).
10
In the instant case the court of appeals dismissed
Lavigne’s racial discrimination because it concluded
that Lavigne’s position had been given to another Afri-
can-American. App. 15a-16a. In Moore v. Duncanville
Ind. School Dist., 358 Fed.Appx. 515 (5th Cir. 2009), the
Fifth Circuit rejected the discrimination claim of the
terminated Hispanic plaintiff because "his replace-
ment was, like him, of Hispanic national origin and
was therefore not ’outside of the protected class.’" 358
Fed.Appx. at 517 (quoting Turner, 476 F.3d at 345). In
Singh v. Shoney’s, Inc., 64 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1995), the
court of appeals dismissed the discrimination claim of
the terminated white plaintiff on the ground that she
"failed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrim-
ination ... , because she was replaced by a white fe-
male." 64 F.3d at 219.
The Fourth Circuit also requires proof of replace-
merit by someone outside the protected class as an el-
ement of a prima facie case. That circuit has repeatedly
dismissed claims of discriminatory termination be-
cause of the race, gender or national origin of the plain-
tiff’s replacement. E.g., McCaskey v. Henry, 461
Fed.Appx. 268,270 (4th Cir. 2012) (race discrimination
claim of black plaintiff dismissed because "a black man
was promoted to fill her positon after her termina-
tion"); Spease v. Public Works Comm’n of City of
Fayetteville, 369 Fed.Appx. 455, 456 (4th Cir. 2010)
(race discrimination claim of black plaintiff dismissed
because he "was replaced by another African-American
male"); Pickworth v. Entrepreneurs’ Organization, 261
11
Fed.Appx. 491,493 (4th Cir. 2008) (pregnancy discrim-
ination claim dismissed because "the record shows that
[plaintiff’s] replacement was pregnant at the time she
was promoted to [the plaintiff’s] former position.");
Garrow v. Economos Properties, Inc., 242 Fed.Appx. 68,
72 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing gender discrimination
claim of female plaintiff because position filled by an-
other woman); Brown v. McLean, 159 F.2d 898, 905
(1998) (gender discrimination claim of male plaintiff
dismissed "because [the plaintiff] was replaced by a
male").
The Sixth Circuit also holds tl~at a plaintiffassert-
ing a discriminatory dismissal must show that he or
she was replaced by a person outside the protected
class in order to establish a prima facie case. Shazor v.
Professional Transit Management, Ltd., 744 F.2d 948,
957 (6th Cir. 2014) ("replaced by someone outside of the
protected class"); Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584,
592 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). In Fuelling v. New Vision
Medical Laboratories LLC, 284 Fed.Appx. 247, 253-54
(6th Cir. 2008), the court of appeals held that the dis-
crimination claim of the white plaintiff "clearly fails
because she was replaced by a white female." In Abeita
v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 253 (6th
Cir. 1998), the gender discrimination claim of the dis-
missed female plaintiff was rejected because "her re-
sponsibilities were split between a number of female...
employees."
The Eleventh Circuit requires plaintiffs in dis-
criminatory dismissal cases to show they were re-
placed by a person outside the protected class. Ezell v.
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Wynn, 802 F.3d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) ("to estab-
lish a prima facie case a plaintiff must show that she
... was replaced by someone outside the protected
class"); Hinson v. Clinch County, Georgia Bd. of Educ.,
231 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[t]o establish a
prima facie case, [plaintiff] has to show.., that she was
replaced by someone outside the protected class").
In the Ninth Circuit as well an essential element
of a "prima facie case of discriminatory discharge [is]
replacement of the plaintiff by a person outside the
protected class." Srinivasan v. Devry Institute of Tech-
nology, 1995 WL 242307 at *3 (9th Cir. April 25, 1995);
see Stonum v. CCH Computax, Inc., 1994 WL 424352
at "1 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1994) (same). In Burks v. Dept.
of Arizona Economic Security, 12 Fed.Appx. 454, 458
(9th Cir. 2001), the court of appeals held that "[the fe-
male plaintiff] failed to establish a prima facie case of
sex discrimination [because she] was replaced by an-
other woman, and, therefore, she cannot meet the test
established by this court .... "
In all of these circuits a prudent attorney today
would not file an action alleging a discriminatory ter-
mination if the employer had replaced the fired worker
with someone of the same protected group. Lavigne
brought the instant lawsuit only because he had a sub-
stantial - although ultimately unsuccessful - factual
argument that he had actually been replaced by a
white worker.
(2) Seven circuits have emphatically rejected
this requirement that a plaintiff show that he or she
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was replaced by a person who is not a member of the
protected group in question. Those circuits have re-
peatedly reversed district court decisions that applied
that requirement.
In Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902
F.2d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 1990) (opinion joined by Breyer,
J.), the First Circuit insisted that
we have never held that the fourth element of
a prima facie discharge case can be fulfilled
only if the complainant shows that she was
replaced by someone outside the protected
group. Indeed, we have said precisely the op-
posite .... [T]oday we set any uncertainty to
rest and rule that, in a case where an em-
ployee claims to have been discharged in vio-
lation of Title VII, she can make out [a] prima
facie case without proving that her job was
filled by a person possessing the protected at-
tribute.
902 F.2d at 155; see Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37
F.3d 712, 719 n.20 (1st Cir. 1994).
The Second Circuit expressly rejects the replace-
ment requirement applied in other circuits.
Although certain courts ... have required an
employee, in making out a prima facie case, to
demonstrate that she was replaced by a per-
son outside the protected class, ..., we believe
such a standard is inappropriate and at odds
with the policies underlying Title VII.
Mieri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989,966 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Were we to adopt a mechanical approach, we
would be required to exempt from Title VII
coverage an employer that, in furtherance of
a broad-based policy of employment discrimi-
nation, discharged one hundred minority em-
ployees, retained nine hundred non-minority
employees, and, by making additional over-
time available to the nine hundred retained
employees, found it unnecessary to replace
any of the discharged employees.
759 F.3d at 996 n.9; see Leibowitz v. Cornell University,
584 F.3d 487,502 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Third Circuit rejected a jury instruction that
would have required a female plaintiff in a gender dis-
crimination case to prove "that she was replaced by a
man." Pivrotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344,
351 (3d Cir. 1999). "It is inconsistent with Title VII to
require a plaintiff to prove that she was replaced by
someone outside her class in order to make out a prima
facie case. We hold that it is error to require a plaintiff
to do so .... " 191 F.3d at 355.
In Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157
(7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit also rejected such
a requirement.
The district court remarked that [the white
plaintiff’s] replacement by a white employee
prevented her from establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination. O’Connor v. Con-
solidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308
(1996), shows that this understanding of a
prima facie case is erroneous .... That one’s
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replacement is of another race, sex, or age
may help raise an inference of discrimination,
but it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition.
82 F.3d at 158; see Bates v. City of Chicago, 726 F.3d
951,954 n.4 (7th Cir. 2013).
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly rejected district
court opinions imposing a replacement requirement.
In Walker v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 881 F.2d
554, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1989), the court of appeals held
that "[a]lthough ... the district court[] belie[ved] that
[the plaintiff] was required to show that she was re-
placed by an individual from outside the protected
class in question, no such per se requirement has tra-
ditionally been imposed in cases brought under Title
VII." 881 F.3d at 558; see Davenport v. Riverview Gar-
dens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 944-45 (8th Cir. 1994); Wil-
liams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir.
1994).
The Tenth Circuit also holds that a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of a discriminatory termi-
nation even though he or she was replaced by a person
in the same protected group.
A non-white employee who claims to have
been discharged as a result of racial discrimi-
nation can establish ... [a] prima facie case
without proving that her job was filled by a
person who does not possess her protected at-
tribute .... [T]he district court erred as a mat-
ter of law when it held that [the Hispanic
plaintiff] failed to make out her prima facie
16
case ... because she was replaced by an His-
panic woman.
Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1138-40 (10th Cir.
1999); see Nguyen v. Gambro BCT, Inc., 242 Fed.Appx.
483, 488 (10th Cir. 2007).
The District of Columbia Circuit’s rejection of the
replacement requirement dates from its decision in
Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
"[W]e hold ... that a plaintiff in a discrimination case
need not demonstrate that she was replaced by a
person outside her protected class in order to carry
her burden of establishing a prima facie case .... " See
Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
447 F.2d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
(3) The disagreement among the courts of ap-
peals is widely recognized. "Federal courts construing
Title VII have ... struggled with ... whether replace-
ment by an individual outside the protected class is a
necessary element [of a prima facie case]. Those courts
have reached varying results .... "Williams v. Pemberton
Township Public Schools, 323 N.J.Super. 490, 501
(App.Div. 1999). The Third Circuit decision in Pivritto
pointed out that the Fourth Circuit standard conflicted
with the majority rule. 191 F.3d at 354 n.6; see Stith v.
Chadbourne & Parke, LLP, 160 F.Supp.2d 1, 11 and n.4
(D.D.C. 2001) (describing conflict).
In Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 1407,
1410 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth Circuit rejected the
"stricter" Fifth Circuit standard. In Clayton v. Meijer,
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Inc., 281 F.3d 605,610 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit
rejected the First Circuit standard. In Mieri the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit decision in Lee v.
Russell County Bd. ofEd., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (llth Cir.
1982). 759 F.3d at 995-96. Commentators have repeat-
edly described the conflict.15
The conflict has been aggravated to some degree
by the fact that federal agencies have taken incon-
sistent positions. In O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Ca-
terers Corp. 517 U.S. 308 (1996), the United States
advised this Court that a prima facie case of discrimi-
natory discharge under Title VII does not require proof
that the plaintiff was replaced by a person outside the
protected class.16 But O’Connor did not resolve that
1~ Note, Dubious Protected Class Distinctions: Eliminating
the Role of Replacement Identity in a Discharged Title VII Plain-
tiff’s Case, 44 B.C.L.Rev. 1295, 1296-1306 (2003); C.R. Senn, Min-
imal Relevance: Non-Disabled Replacement Evidence in ADA
Discrimination Cases, 66 Baylor L.Rev. 65, 78 (2014) ("the federal
circuits are split on whether ... replacement evidence is (and
should be) a legally necessary element of [a] ... plaintiff’s prima
facie case"); Note, The Replacement Dilemma: An Argument for
Eliminating A Non-Class Replacement Requirement in the Prima
Facie Stage of Title VII Individual Disparate Treatment Discrim-
ination Claims, 101 Mich.L.Rev. 1338, 1340-43 and nn.18-25
(2003) ("Lower courts are inconsistent in deciding whether an em-
ployee must show that her job replacement is someone outside her
protected class to sustain her prima facie burden under Title
VII"); Note, A Matter of Class: The Impact of Brown v. McLean on
Employee Discharge Cases, 46 Vill.L.Rev. 421, 429-30 and nn.41-
47 (2001).
16 Brief for the United States and Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, avail-
able at 1995 WL 793447 at "16-’17.
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issue under Title VII, and subsequent to 1995 the De-
partment of Justice in defending Title VII claims
against federal agencies has endorsed such a require-
ment,17 while the EEOC has advanced the opposite in-
terpretation of Title VII.iS A grant of certiorari would
prompt the Solicitor General to frame a single, con-
sistent Executive Branch position on this issue.
B. The Replacement Requirement Is Clearly
Inconsistent With Title VII
The replacement requirement effectively defines
what discrimination is, and is not, unlawful under Ti-
tle VII. Under prevailing practice in the lower courts,
a Title VII claim will almost invariably be dismissed if
the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case. Any
legal standard establishing a requirement for a prima
facie case thus effectively excludes from the protec-
tions of Title VII cases in which that requirement
would not be met. In a circuit that imposes a re-
placement requirement, an employer which engages
in intentional discrimination can avoid liability by
17 Brief for Appellee, Fuentes v. Postmaster General, No. 07-
10426 (5th Cir.), available at 2007 WL 5129524 at "19, *22; Brief
of Defendant-Appellee United States, Greene v. Potter, No. 06-
30953 (5th Cir.), available at 2007 WL 3389323 at "19; Brief of
Appellee, Lopez v. Martinez, No. 05-11300 (5th Cir.), available at
2007 WL 3000609.
is Enforcement Guidance on O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., available at 1996 WL 33161340 at *3 and n.4;
Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Miles v. Dell, Inc., No. 04-
2500 (4th Cir.), available at 2005 WL 2038371 at "19.
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replacing a terminated worker with another person
from the same protected group.
The United States correctly advised this Court in
O’Connor that intentional discrimination could indeed
occur even though a terminated worker was replaced
by a person from the same protected group.
There are some situations in which an em-
ployer might discriminate on the basis of (for
example) race by refusing to hire a black per-
son, even if another black person is ultimately
hired for the same or similar position. An
employer engaging in racial discrimination
might ... reassign a few minority employees to
conceal discrimination .... Such actions would
constitute prohibited discrimination, even if
the persons eventually chosen to fill the posi-
tions were black.
Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission As Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., No. 95-354, available at 1995 WL 793447 at "17.
The lower courts have recognized that there are a wide
variety of circumstances in which, despite such same-
group replacement, intentional discrimination would
indeed occur. Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d
at 158; Pivritto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d at
353; Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d at 1137.
An employer "cannot purge [unlawful racial dis-
crimination against one worker] by hiring another per-
son of the same race later." Carson, 82 F.3d at 158.
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"Title VII does not permit the victim of a... discrimina-
tory policy to be told that he has not been wronged be-
cause other persons of his or her race or sex were
[treated more favorably.]" Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 455 (1982). "Irrespective of the form taken by the
discriminatory practice, an employer’s treatment of
other members of the plaintiffs’ group can be ’of little
comfort to the victims of ... discrimination.’" Id. at 455
(quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 432
(1977)). "Congress never intended to give an employer
license to discriminate against some employees on the
basis of race or sex merely because he treats favorably
other members of the employees’ group." Id. at 455. "It
is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Ti-
tle VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each ap-
plicant regardless of race, without regard to whether
members of the applicant’s race are already propor-
tionately represented in the work force." Furnco Const.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
II. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT CIRCUIT CON-
FLICT REGARDING WHETHER A TITLE
VII CHARGE MUST IDENTIFY ALL OF AN
EMPLOYER’S UNLAWFUL MOTIVES
This case also presents an issue central to the
administration of Title VII and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes. Prior to commencing a suit
under Title VII, a claimant must file a charge with
EEOC. It is common for a claimant, after filing a
charge asserting that the employer acted with one
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particular unlawful motive, to later assert that the
employer action in question was also the result of
another unlawful motive.19 Title VII forbids conduct
based on any of six different unlawful motives.2°
The courts of appeals are sharply divided regard-
ing whether a claimant can later assert the existence
of such an additional unlawful motive. The question
arises in two different contexts. In some cases the
claimant seeks to amend his or her original EEOC
charge to assert the existence of an additional motive
for employer conduct, but does so after the expiration
of the 300 day charge-filing period. In other cases the
claimant does not amend his or her charge, but simply
includes in a subsequent civil action a claim that the
employer conduct that was the subject of the EEOC
charge was also the result of an additional unlawful
motive.
Ao There Is A Deeply Entrenched and Well
Recognized Circuit Conflict About This
Issue
(1) Three circuits hold that a Title VII suit is lim-
ited to the particular unlawful motive asserted in the
19 This problem also arises in cases in which the initial and
later-asserted motives are forbidden by different statutes, such
as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans
With Disabilities Act.
~o Title VII generally forbids actions taken for the purpose of
discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion
or gender, or for the purpose of retaliating against an individual
because he or she engaged in certain protected activity.
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original EEOC charge, and that an amendment to such
a charge asserting an additional motive for the em-
ployer conduct at issue does not relate back to the date
the original charge was filed. These decisions refer to
such a claim of an additional unlawful motive as rais-
ing a "new theory" or "new legal theory," and hold that
an amendment with such a new theory generally does
not relate back and that the additional unlawful mo-
tive thus cannot be included in a Title VII action.
The decision below applies the longstanding Fifth
Circuit rule21 that generally "amendments that raise a
new legal theory do not ’relate back’ to an original
charge of discrimination." App. 17a (quoting Manning
v. Chevron Chemical Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878-79 (5th Cir.
2003)). "[D]iscriminat[ory] and retaliat[ory] [motives]
are distinct, and the allegation of one in an EEO
charge does not exhaust a plaintiff’s remedies as to the
other." App. 17a (quoting Bouvier v. Northrup Grum-
man Ship Sys. Inc., 350 Fed.Appx. 917, 921 (5th Cir.
2009)). In the Fifth Circuit a charging party is ordinar-
ily limited to the unlawful motive that was identified
by checking the relevant box on the EEOC charge
form.2~ The Fifth Circuit recognizes a "narrow excep-
tion" to this requirement, limited to instances in which
21 The Fifth Circuit has applied this stringent rule on numer-
ous occasions. Thibodeaux v. Texas, 2016 WL 4547230 at *2 (5th
Cir. Aug. 31, 2016); Carter v. Target Corp., 541 Fed.Appx. 413,419
(5th Cir. 2013); Bouvier v. Northrup Grumman Ship Systems, Inc.,
350 Fed.Appx. 917,921 (5th Cir. 2009); Teffera v. North Texas Toll-
way Authority, 121 Fed.Appx. 18 (5th Cir. 2004).
22 The EEOC actually prepares these forms, based on an In-
take Questionnaire filled out by the charging party.
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the discursive portion of a charge sets out facts stating
a claim that some additional unlawful motive was pre-
sent. Manning, 332 F.3d at 879. The court below ex-
plained that in this case this meant that Lavigne
would have had to allege in the body of his original
charge each of the factual elements of a retaliation
claim. App. 17a (quoting Stewart v. Miss. Transp.
Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009)). Lavigne’s
retaliation claim was barred because the "original
Charge of Discrimination does not allege these facts"
(App. 18a), and because the "Retaliation" box on the
EEOC charge form had not been checked. Id.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the EEOC
regulations expressly permit relation back of certain
amendments to a Title VII charge. App. 17a. In the in-
stant case it was the EEOC itself which proposed that
Lavigne’s charge be amended, and which drafted the
amendment. The EEOC then accepted the amendment
which Lavigne had signed, and proceeded to investi-
gate the retaliation claim. In the Fifth Circuit’s view,
the EEOC should never have done any of those things,
and ought instead have rejected any such amendment
if proposed by Lavigne himself. The Fifth Circuit holds
that the investigative authority of the EEOC is limited
to the claims of discrimination that are within the
scope of a timely EEOC charge. EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477,481-84 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Tenth Circuit also holds that a claimant can-
not amend his original claim after the 300 day charge-
filing period to assert the existence of an additional
unlawful purpose, or bring a Title VII suit asserting
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such an unlawful purpose. Simms v. Oklahoma, 165
F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999). In Simms the plaintiff’s
original charge alleged he had been denied a promo-
tion because of his race; the amended charge asserted
that the promotion denial was also the result of a re-
taliatory motive. The EEOC accepted the amendment,
investigated the charge and found reasonable cause to
believe the allegation was true. 165 F.3d at 1325. The
Tenth Circuit dismissed the retaliation claim.
[A]n amendment will not relate back when it
advances a new theory of recovery, regardless
of the facts included in the original com-
plaint .... Prohibiting amendments that in-
clude entirely new theories of recovery
furthers the goals of the statutory filing
period - giving the employer notice and
providing opportunity for administrative in-
vestigation and conciliation.
165 F.3d at 1327.
The Seventh Circuit imposed the same restriction
in Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567 (7th
Cir. 1998). The plaintiff in that case had filed a timely
EEOC charge alleging that he had been fired because
of his age; after the deadline for filing a new charge
had expired, the plaintiff attempted to amend his orig-
inal charge to assert that the dismissal was also the
result of discrimination on the basis of disability. 147
F.3d at 574. The Seventh Circuit held that such an
amendment was impermissible because it asserted "an
additional basis of legal liability" for the dismissal.
"[A]n untimely amendment that alleges an entirely
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new theory of recovery does not relate back to a timely
filed original charge," 147 F.3d at 575.
(2) Four circuits reject the restrictive rule ap-
plied in the Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. The
leading case to the contrary is the Eighth Circuit deci-
sion in Washington v. The Kroger Company, 671 F.2d
1072 (8th Cir. 1982). The original charge in that case
asserted that the plaintiff had been denied certain de-
sirable duties because of her gender; several years
later she filed a new charge (in what the courts treated
as an amendment) that she had also been denied those
duties because of her race. The Eighth Circuit held the
amendment related back under the governing EEOC
regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).
It is true that the nature of the discrimination
alleged in Washington’s first charge and the
basis for it differ somewhat from the discrim-
ination and motive alleged in the second
charge. But ... It]he fact that the second com-
plaint filed with the EEOC alleges a basis for
discrimination different from that alleged in
the first EEOC charge is not dispositive here,
where the aggrieved person is a non-lawyer
who may be unaware of the true basis for
the alleged discriminatory acts until an inves-
tigation has been made ... [P]rocedural re-
quirements should not be applied with an
unrealistic or technical stringency to proceed-
ings initiated by uncounseled complainants.
671 F.2d at 1075-76.
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The First Circuit permits Title VII actions assert-
ing the existence of additional unlawful motive even in
the absence of an amended charge. In that circuit a
charge is sufficient to exhaust not only a claim regard-
ing the motive specified in the charge, but also a claim
about any other unlawful motive that might have been
unearthed if the EEOC investigated the employer con-
duct. "The scope of the civil complaint is ... limited by
the charge filed with the EEOC and the investigation
which can reasonably be expected to grow out of that
charge." Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 38 (1st
Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (opinion joined by Breyer,
J.) (quoting Less v. Nestle Co., 705 F.Supp. 110, 112
(W.D.N.Y. 1988)). "IT]he scope of investigation rule per-
mits a district court to look beyond the four corners of
the underlying administrative charge to consider ... al-
ternative bases or acts that would have been uncov-
ered in a reasonable investigation." Thornton v. United
Parcel Service, 587 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2009).
In Hicks v. ABT Associates, 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir.
1978), the Third Circuit held that an amendment to an
EEOC charge relates back when it asserts a new un-
lawful motive for the employer conduct that was the
subject of the original charge.
[I]nstances of sex discrimination [asserted in
the amendment] ... arise from the same acts
which support claims for race discrimination
[in the original charge] .... If relation back
were not permitted in these circumstances, a
charging party might be faced with the often
difficult burden of analyzing without the
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benefits of any discovery his employer’s moti-
vation for an action immediately after that ac-
tion occurred.
572 F.3d at 965. In Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 750 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit
applied that principle to a case in which the original
charge had not been amended, and the allegation of an
additional unlawful motive first appeared in the com-
plaint. "Howze’s new retaliation claim ’may fairly be
considered [an] explanation[] of the original charge .... ’"
750 F.2d at 1212 (quoting Ostapowicz v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976). Howze
treated the plaintiff’s "[original] discrimination and
[subsequent] retaliation claims [as] alternative allega-
tions regarding the employer’s failure to promote the
plaintiff." Barzanty v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., 361
Fed.Appx. 41,414 (3d Cir. 2010.). District courts in the
Third Circuit have repeatedly interpreted Howze to
mean that where a Title VII charge asserts that an ad-
verse action was taken for a discriminatory motive, it
is sufficient to encompass a subsequent claim that that
particular action was also the result of a retaliatory
motive.23 In addition, in the Third Circuit a claim re-
garding an additional motive is sufficiently exhausted
23 Mondero v. Lewes Surgical & Medical Associates, RA.,
2014 WL 6968847 at *6-*7 (D.Del. Dec. 9, 2014); Walker-Robinson
v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2012 WL 3079179 at *7-*8 (D.N.J. July
27, 2012); Pina v. Henkel Corp., 2008 WL 819901 at *5-*6 (E.D.Pa.
March 26, 2008); Rouse v. II-VI, Inc., 2007 WL 1007925 at *9
(W.D.Pa. March 30, 2007); Foust v. FMC Corp., 962 F.Supp. 650,
654 (E.D.Pa. 1997).
28
whenever the charge in fact resulted in an EEOC in-
vestigation of that possible unlawful motive. Antol v.
Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (opinion joined
by Alito, J.).
In the Eleventh Circuit a charge asserting one
form of discrimination is sufficient to exhaust other ad-
ditional discrimination or retaliation claims that are
"inextricably intertwined" with the particular allega-
tions of the charge itself. Harrison v. International
Business Machines, 378 Fed.Appx. 950, 953 (11th Cir.
2010); Green v. Elixir Industries, Inc., 407 F.3d 1163,
1169 (11th Cir. 2005); Gregory v. Georgia Dept. of Hu-
man Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).
Two claims are "inextricably intertwined" when they
assert alternative unlawful motives for the same era-
ployer conduct. Harrison, 378 Fed.Appx. at 953. That
circuit recognizes that a reasonable EEOC in~estiga-
tion of employer conduct could encompass any unlaw-
ful purpose that led to the disputed action. "An EEOC
investigation of [the motive asserted in the original
charge] ... would have reasonably uncovered any evi-
dence of [another unlawful motive]." Gregory, 355 F.3d
at 1280.
(3) The Fourth Circuit at one time held that an
amendment to an EEOC charge that adds a new the-
ory of recovery - i.e., alleges an additional unlawful
motive - does not relate back to the original charge.
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Services Co., 80
F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996). That decision necessarily in-
volved an interpretation of the applicable EEOC rela-
tion-back regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). In 2012
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the Fourth Circuit abandoned its earlier interpretation
of § 1601.12(b), after the EEOC filed a brief setting
forth the agency’s construction of that regulation.
EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2012).
Section 1601.12(b) provides that an amendment
"to clarify and amplify allegations [in the original
charge]" will relate back to the date on which the orig-
inal charge was filed. The Fourth Circuit recognized
that the
EEOC interprets the phrase "clarif[ies] and am-
plif[ies] allegations" as encompassing amended
charges in which ... the charging party makes
no new factual allegations, but rather solely
revises his or her charge to allege that the
same facts constitute a violation of a different
statute ... Interpreting § 1601.12(b) as apply-
ing to amended charges that alter solely the
statutory basis or legal theory of recovery is
entirely consistent with th[e] purposes [of the
time limit] .... [W]e defer to the EEOC’s prom-
ulgation of § 1601.12(b) and its interpretation
thereof.
Randstad, 685 F.3d at 444. In addition, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has long held that a charge is sufficient to exhaust
a claim regarding a motive not set out in the charge,
even if that charge was never amended, if the EEOC’s
investigation of the charge in fact considered that ad-
ditional possible unlawful motive. Hentosh v. Old Do-
minion University, 767 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 2014);
Webster v. Rumsfeld, 156 Fed.Appx. 571, 580 n.3 (4th
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Cir. 2005); King v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad. Co.,
538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976).
(4) The Ninth Circuit applies a general rule lira-
iting an employment discrimination action to the too-
tive asserted in the original charge, and declining to
permit relation back of an amended charge that as-
serts the existence of an additional motive. Pejic v.
Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988).
But in the Ninth Circuit - unlike the Fifth, Seventh
and Tenth - a plaintiff can pursue a claim involving a
type of discriminatory motive not asserted in the orig-
inal charge (whether amended or not) if the EEOC’s
investigation actually looked into whether that addi-
tional unlawful motive was present.
The ... scope of a Title VII claimant’s court ac-
tion depends upon the scope of both the EEOC
charge and the EEOC investigation .... We
therefore must examine proceedings before
the EEOC to determine the scope of ... [the
plaintiff’s] case .... We conduct this inquiry
into allegations occurring not only before, but
also after the filling of [the] EEOC charge.
Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1457 (9th Cir. 1990);
see EEOC v. Farmer Brothers Co., 31 F.3d 891,899 (9th
Cir. 1994) (additional claim exhausted if it "fell within
the scope of EEOC’s actual investigation") (emphasis
in original; quoting Sosa); Stephenson v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 9 Fed.Appx. 760, 761 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The
district court must examine both the EEOC charge and
the EEOC investigation to determine if claims are
exhausted .... Exhausted claims include those actually
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investigated"). In the instant case, as the defendant
conceded, the EEOC did indeed investigate Lavigne’s
retaliation claim. App. 24a.
(5) This circuit conflict is well recognized. The
First Circuit has noted that
the courts ... have sometimes allowed court
claims that go beyond the claim or claims
made to the agency, and sometimes not. The
outcomes and rationales vary markedly
where the claimant offers ... an entirely new
theory.... [T]he courts are far more divided,
and the law more confused, on how to handle
situations in which a plaintiff advances in
court claims based on ... alternative theories
that were never presented to the agency.
Clockedile v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 245
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) (contrasting decision in the
Third Circuit with decision in the Seventh Circuit).
The Tenth Circuit recognizes that
[s]ome courts have held that [the] language
[of § 1601.12(b)] encompasses claims based on
different legal theories that derive from the
same set of operative facts that included in
the original charge .... Other courts have con-
cluded that an amendment will not relate
back when it advances a new theory of recov-
ery, regardless of the facts included in the
original complaint.
Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d at 1326-27 (contrasting
decision in the Eighth Circuit with decisions in the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits). In Fairchild the Seventh
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Circuit acknowledged that relation back of an amend-
ment that asserts a new motive "has some support in
decisions from other circuits," but rejected the Eighth
Circuit rule in Washington v. Kroger Co., 147 F.3d at
574-75. A series of district court decisions have de-
scribed this conflict as well.24
B. The Pleading Requirement Imposed by
The Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits
Undermines The Title VII Administra-
tive Scheme and Is Inconsistent With
Title VII and The Applicable EEOC Reg-
ulations
This issue is of great practical importance both to
charging parties and to the EEOC itself. The EEOC re-
ceives about 90,000 charges a year. Most of these
24 Ramos v. Vizcarrondo, 120 F.Supp.3d 93,104 (D.P.R. 2015)
("[the] circuits have addressed [the issue] and have arrived at dif-
fering results ... [about amendments] with additional legal theo-
ries"); Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank Ltd., 751 F.Supp. 1565, 1573
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("While some courts have not permitted plaintiffs
such broad latitude in adding separate bases for the alleged dis-
crimination, ... the majority of courts have allowed plaintiffs con-
siderable latitude in fleshing out the factual circumstances
surrounding their initial complaint"); Dumas v. Kroger Ltd. Part-
nership I, 2012 WL 3528972 at *2 (E.D.Ark. Aug. 14, 2012)
("though some Courts of Appeals have taken the view that an
amendment will not relate back if it advances a new theory of
recovery, that is not the Eighth Circuit’s view"); EEOC v. Schwan’s
Home Service, 692 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1081 n.9 (D.Minn. 2010)
("[C]ourts around the country have reached different results as to
whether claims premised on different legal theories that stem
from the same set of operative facts stated in the original charge
relate back to the original charge").
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claims involve covert unlawful motives. An unlawfully
motivated employer typically misrepresents its rea-
sons for the adverse action in question, and the victim-
ized employee must file his or her administrative
charge at a point when he or she has only limited evi-
dence, and no formal discovery, regarding what the
covert unlawful purpose may have been. In Fifth, Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits, where the scope of a charge is
limited to the particular unlawful motive identified in
the original charge, and an amendment asserting an
additional motive will not relate back, an employer’s
ingenuity in hiding its illegal motive can effectively im-
munize its violations of federal law.
As the EEOC has repeatedly explained in the
lower courts, the Commission’s practice is to investi-
gate any potentially unlawful motive that may be be-
hind the particular employment action covered by a
charge.2~ A rule barring relation back of an amendment
asserting the existence of additional unlawful motives,
the EEOC has warned,
undermines the EEOC’s ability to perform
the enforcement role that Congress has as-
signed to it, because it will hamper the Com-
mission’s ability to inquire thoroughly into
the circumstances surrounding an allegation
25 Brief of EEOC as Appellant, EEOC v. Southern Farm Bu-
reau Casualty Ins. Co., No. 00-31482 (5th Cir.), available at 2001
WL 34105288 at "18-’22; Reply Brief of EEOC as Appellant,
EEOC v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., No. 00-31482
(5th Cir.), available at 2001 WL 34105287 at *5, *11-’13.
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of discrimination the EEOC had already be-
gun to investigate.
Opening Brief of Appellant EEOC, EEOC v. Randstad,
No. 11-179 (4th Cir.), available at 2011 WL 4369366 at
*27-*28. The EEOC interprets its relation-back regu-
lation to provide that an amendment which asserts an
additional motive will relate back. "[T]he relation-back
regulation permits a charging party ... to amend his
charge to ’clarify’ and ’amplify’ his original allegations
by adding an additional potential explanation for the
discrimination he experienced." Reply Brief of Appel-
lant EEOC, EEOC v. Randstad, No. 11-179 (4th Cir.),
available at 2011 WL 5838294 at "14 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)).
Nothing in the Title VII or the relevant regula-
tions limits a charging party’s claims to the particular
unlawful motive that might have been asserted in the
original charge. Section 706(b) of Title VII provides in
general terms that a claimant must first file with the
EEOC a "charge... alleging that an employer.., has en-
gaged in an unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b). The applicable EEOC regulation requires
only that a charge "describe generally the action or
practices complained of." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). Sec-
tion 706(b) directs the EEOC, upon receipt of a charge,
to notify the employer of the "date, place and circum-
stances of the alleged unlawful employment practice."
None of these provisions requires the charging party
to specify which unlawful motive was behind the un-
derlying adverse action. As the EEOC has explained,
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"an amendment [asserting an additional unlawful mo-
tive] does not assert a ’stale’ claim [if] it does not allege
any new discriminatory incidents. It merely clarifies
that there is another possible explanation for the em-
ployment action referenced in the original charge .... "
Opening Brief of Appellant EEOC, EEOC v. Randstad,
2011 WL 4369366 at *26.
Correctly identifying the unlawful motive behind
an adverse action will often be beyond the ability of the
injured worker. Title VII establishes the EEOC charge
processing system precisely so that the Commission
can bring to bear its experience and investigative abil-
ities, which charging parties will lack. The very pur-
pose of that administrative process would often be
thwarted if an amendment could not encompass, the
EEOC could not permissibly investigate, and a subse-
quent lawsuit could not include, motives which the
charging party himself was initially unable to detect.
Correct categorization of an unlawful motive at
times requires significant legal expertise; in the in-
stant case, for example, the district court held that re-
prisals taken because an individual complained about
racial discrimination constitute a form of racial dis-
crimination under Title VI, but are classified as retali-
ation under Title VII. App. 40a. The Fifth Circuit below
characterized Lavigne’s retaliation claim as a "new le-
gal theory" (App. 17a), and faulted him for not having
raised that new legal theory at an earlier stage. "Such
technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a stat-
utory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained
lawyers, initiate the process." Love v. Pullman Co., 404
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U.S. 522, 527 (1972). "Whatever [the plaintiff’s] level
of education, there is no question that he should not be
held to the level of understanding the distinctive legal
nuances" that may separate the different types of Title
VII violations. Green v. Elixir Industries, Inc., 407 F.3d
1163, 1168 (11th Cir. 2005).
This Court has emphasized that "a charge is not
the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit."
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984). But if the
charge filing process were governed by the standards
applicable to a civil action, Lavigne’s amended charge
would indeed have related back. Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an amendment
to a complaint relates back if it "asserts a claim ... that
arose out of the conduct ... or occurrence set out ... in
the original pleading." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(c)(1)(B). A
charge amendment which asserts an additional unlaw-
ful motive for employer conduct covered by the original
charge is a classic example of a claim that arises out of
the conduct or occurrence in the original pleading. The
Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits impose on uncouno
seled laymen seeking assistance from the EEOC a
pleading burden that is utterly inconsistent with the
intent of Congress to create an informal and readily
accessible administrative process.
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III. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT
VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING THE QUES-
TIONS PRESENTED
This case presents an excellent vehicle for resolv-
ing both questions presented. The court of appeals re-
jected Lavigne’s racial discrimination in dismissal
claim solely on the ground that Lavigne could not
prove that his replacement was white. The court of ap-
peals rejected Lavigne’s retaliation claim only on the
ground that the asserted retaliatory motive was a
different "legal theory" than the motive asserted in
plaintiff’s original Title VII charge. Because Lavigne
attempted to amend his original charge to include a
claim that the dismissal was retaliatory, this case pre-
sents a vehicle for deciding both whether such an
amendment relates back to the date of the original
charge, and also whether the original charge itself was
sufficient to exhaust Lavigne’s claims even if no
amendment had been filed.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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